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REAGAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY SAID MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN PREDECESSORS'

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[Article by V. V. Zhurkin: "The Strategy of Nuclear Aggression"]

[Text] From the very beginning, the Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy was based on the hope of disrupting the existing military-strategic balance in the world. Furthermore, the dangerous destabilizing features of this strategy grew stronger with each year, and this is clearly reflected in the main presidential documents on matters of military strategy--national security decision directives NSDD-13 (1981), NSDD-32 (1982), NSDD-85 (1983) and NSDD-119 (1984)--and the plans and objectives of the U.S. Defense Department.

Western experts on military affairs frequently argue about the new elements the Reagan Administration added to U.S. nuclear strategy and the areas in which it followed tradition--they argue about the balance of old and new elements. These arguments obscure the main consideration.

The main consideration is the fact that the Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy quite unequivocally combines continuity with innovation. As far as continuity is concerned, this strategy adopted all of the most dangerous and adventuristic features of postwar American doctrines and theories, concentrating them in a single knot. All of the current administration's innovations have the same purpose and are dictated by a single major objective--the achievement of superiority to the USSR and the development of the U.S. ability to "win" a nuclear war.

At first, these aims were openly, and even ostentatiously, announced by administration officials. Later, after realizing that they had frightened the Americans and their allies, they began to speak in the unctuous tones of "peacemakers." However, "in the beginning was the word," and it was absolutely unambiguous.

The 1980 Republican campaign platform, drafted by Reaganists, already contained the frank statement: "We must secure a sufficient increase in military spending for the eventual achievement of military superiority."¹ The reasons why this superiority was necessary were explained repeatedly by President R. Reagan, who stressed that he wanted American nuclear forces to be able to fight a protracted

As for the material preparations for nuclear war, the foundations of the program for the achievement of nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union ("the most all-encompassing and far-reaching effort of the last 20 years,"⁷ as it was described by the U.S. Congress) were set forth by Ronald Reagan on 2 October 1981. The program was later clarified and expanded considerably in a series of presidential decisions, particularly his directive on national space policy of 4 July 1982 and his decision on space-based and other ABM systems of 23 March 1983, followed by the directive of 25 March on national security decisions (NSDD-85) on ways of "eliminating the threat posed by ballistic missiles." All of this was further clarified in a directive (NSDD-119) signed by Reagan on 6 January 1984 and listing the basic guidelines of ABM system engineering.

One of the distinctive features of current programs is the careful preparation of reserve funds for the future to secure the quantitative and qualitative buildup of U.S. strategic arms up to the end of the 20th century and into the 21st. Stepped-up modernization is being conducted in all links of the former strategic triad (ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers), which, with the development of sea-, land- and air-based cruise missiles and the mass-scale deployment of medium-range missiles, is turning into a pentagonal nuclear structure. The program for the development of ABM systems, closely related to the plans for the militarization of space and often called "star wars" in the United States, is the latest "rage" in Washington. American strategists dream of turning these systems into something just short of the main means of delivering a first strike in the future.

The "star wars" apologists are now concentrating on two areas--the development of antisatellite weapons and the establishment of a massive antisatellite system based partly in space and partly on land. Both of these areas are closely interrelated: The destruction of the other side's satellites, in order to "blind" it, has always been regarded by the United States as a major element of a surprise first strike. The extensive ABM system is supposed to prevent a retaliatory strike by the other side after it has been weakened by an American nuclear attack. Furthermore, the development of anti-satellite weapons is regarded as a specific current objective. The plans for the broad-scale ABM system, based on land and, in particular, in space, are a militarist program for the future, extending into the 21st century.

The initial stages of this work have been intensive, and the first sizable allocations have been authorized. The estimated cost of the program in the 1980's is 26 billion dollars, but it could exceed 500 billion by the end of the century. More than 100 platforms, carrying lasers for the destruction of ballistic missiles, are to be launched into space.⁸ The Pentagon's construction of a center for the coordination of space operations is already under way east of Colorado Springs. Thousands of people are being transferred there, and firms such as Lockheed, Martin Marietta and Boeing are establishing their own facilities there. The construction of a Pentagon launching site for military "shuttles" is being completed on Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. All of this is only the beginning.

A complete "star wars" control system is being organized in the United States: A space command was added to the U.S. Air Force on 1 September 1982 and to the

Reaganism's public relations experts described this reduction as something just short of proof of the new administration's balanced approach to strategic programs. But the "midgetman" decision put everything in place: The plan consisted in expanding, and not reducing, ICBM programs by means of diversification. Different varieties of the "midgetman" type of missile had been discussed in the United States for several years, but under different names, such as the Pershing III (with the addition of two new stages to the Pershing II missile and the extension of its range to 13,000 kilometers), the Boeing firm's so-called small missile (300-stage, with a range of over 10,000 kilometers), etc. The Scowcroft commission recommended the deployment of many "small" missiles in addition, and not in place of, the MX missiles.¹¹ Therefore, we can definitely say that as far as ICBM's are concerned, Reagan's program envisaged a dramatic breakthrough in the expansion of their first-strike capabilities from the very beginning.

This is precisely the aim of the changes in the program for the expansion of the underwater component of U.S. strategic forces--the construction of nuclear submarines of the Trident type with C4 and D5 missiles. The traditional submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) have usually been regarded as "second-strike" weapons in the United States in connection with their insufficient accuracy, their comparatively less powerful nuclear ammunition and their much shorter range in comparison to ICBM's. The Trident system is making a break with this tradition. In terms of accuracy and explosive force, its missiles are comparable to ICBM's, and the Trident II system (B5) will use warheads as powerful as those on the MX missiles (MK-21), with the sole difference that they will be given a new name (MK-5).¹² For the first time in the history of U.S. strategic forces, submarine-launched missiles are comparable to land-based ICBM's in terms of combat capabilities. Furthermore, they are comparable to ICBM's with all of the characteristics of a first-strike weapon. The Trident program was stepped up at the very beginning of the Reagan Administration. A fifth submarine of this type was added to the existing four, six others are now in the shipyards, and the fourth of these (or the ninth of all the ships) will be equipped with Trident II missiles in 1988.

The first-strike capability of U.S. strategic aviation is being developed primarily with a huge quantity (according to various sources, from 3,500 to 5,500) of cruise missiles. More than 60 of the B-52 heavy bombers included in U.S. strategic aviation have already been equipped with these missiles.¹³ Cruise missiles will also be installed on the new B-1B bombers, the projected manufacture of which was announced by Ronald Reagan in October 1981, and later on the even more highly perfected strategic bombers which have been named "Stealth" bombers for their ability to escape detection by radar and other means of air defense. The first allocations for the Stealth bomber were authorized by the Reagan Administration in fiscal year 1982.

When American experts discuss cruise missiles, they usually say nothing about the fundamentally new features they added to the system of U.S. strategic forces. They try to describe them merely as some kind of extension of the capabilities of a particular branch of the armed forces or as an addition to the existing properties of these forces. In fact, however, the cruise missiles have become a separate, although diversified in terms of basing methods (air, sea and land), new component of U.S. strategic forces.

the Pershing II: the "penetrating" W-86 and the conventional W-85, and exactly 3 times as much was spent on the development of the former as on the latter in the beginning of the 1980's.¹⁸ Suddenly, however, it was officially announced that the conventional warhead had been chosen for the Pershing II, and all information about the "penetrating" warhead was simultaneously classified. Since the Pentagon regularly plays games of this kind, it is probable that the story of the Pershing II warheads will be continued (particularly since at least 384 Pershing II missiles will now be sent to Europe instead of the officially projected figure of 108). Meanwhile, Washington is moving ahead in the scheduled deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, begun at the end of 1983, escalating tension on the European continent.

The change in priorities in the system called "C³" in the United States (command, control and communications) has played a unique role in the Reagan Administration's preparations for nuclear aggression. Allocations for this system have approximately doubled in real terms under the Reagan Administration, increasing at almost the same speed as expenditures on strategic nuclear forces.¹⁹

Of course, Washington has always paid close attention to the C³ system, just as to intelligence. There has been constant development in both of the main varieties of this system, which have been clearly separated by American researchers:²⁰ one variety for peacetime, crises and conventional war, and the other designed specifically for nuclear war.

A new feature of Reagan's program is the special emphasis on the systems of C³ and intelligence, which are supposed to survive a "protracted" nuclear war and continue functioning under these conditions. This objective was set back in fall 1981 in NSDD-12 on "strategic communications" and was later amplified in a number of other fundamental documents. In accordance with these decisions, airborne command posts are being enlarged and perfected, particularly the four presidential E-4B Boeing planes, a communication system is being adapted for "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war, satellites capable of quickly estimating the effects of an American nuclear attack are being perfected, etc. All of this is part of the massive efforts to prepare U.S. nuclear forces for a first strike.

The Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy was set forth just as clearly and unambiguously as the plans for its material support. A document on "defense objectives for fiscal years 1984-1988" said that the goal of this strategy consisted in "shattering the entire structure of the military and political strength of the Soviet Union and its allies."²¹ A comprehensive general plan for the accumulation and use of nuclear weapons was adopted for the first time under the Reagan Administration. In this plan, the stages of the nuclear arms buildup are related to detailed preparations for a nuclear attack.

A distinctive feature of Reagan's nuclear strategy was and is the absence of any official name for this strategy. Previous strategies were the "massive retaliation" of D. Eisenhower and G. Dulles, the "flexible response" of

hope in the event of war is a full-scale pre-emptive strike."²⁴ Under the Reagan Administration this obsession has been elevated to its highest point and has been dressed in the garb of government policy.

The strategy of "massive retaliation" once envisaged the accelerated transfer to the use of nuclear weapons even in local conflicts. Today's Washington strategists are actively preparing for this use of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world--the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and East Asia.

Europe is still the main zone of potential nuclear aggression. Defense Department objectives for fiscal years 1984-1988 directly envisage the possibility of the first use of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The objectives specifically state: "Plans for the initial and subsequent use of battlefield nuclear forces must be drawn up to give the supreme command flexibility in the use of battlefield nuclear forces in different ways and on different levels."²⁵ In this way, the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles has already been directly related to first-strike plans.

On the surface, Reagan's strategy is also similar to another doctrine of the period of American nuclear superiority--"flexible response"--and not only because the word "flexibility" is used so much in all of C. Weinberger's reports. They are similar because the current administration's strategy envisages the broadest range of methods of using military force. But there is also a fundamental difference. The doctrine of "flexible response" envisaged the use of conventional armed forces in a variety of ways with the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in later stages. In the Reagan-Weinberger doctrine, the main sphere of "flexibility" has become the search for the greatest variety of ways of using nuclear weapons. Different versions of "limited" and "local" nuclear wars have been outlined, but the greatest effort has been invested in the development of the concept of "protracted" nuclear wars, the first signs of which were evident under the Carter Administration, especially in PD-59.

"Protracted" nuclear war has become a genuine religious symbol for Washington strategists. The defense objectives for fiscal years 1984-1988 stressed that "U.S. nuclear forces should prevail in a protracted war."²⁶ Various plans are being worked out for wars of different lengths, designed for a few weeks or months. In August 1982 the Pentagon submitted a detailed plan to the National Security Council for a strategic nuclear war lasting up to 6 months.²⁷ Methods of fighting a "protracted" nuclear war continued to be clarified after this.

During the process of this clarification, it has been persistently stressed that U.S. nuclear forces and their C³ systems should be given maximum "flexibility and durability" and the ability to quickly assess the damages inflicted by American strikes on the other side, retarget strategic weapons and maneuver them. As Pentagon objectives state, "it will be necessary to hold part of U.S. offensive nuclear forces in reserve, under any circumstances, so that the United States will never be left with no nuclear weapons at the end of a nuclear war."²⁸ The expectation of a prolonged nuclear conflict has become an important element of American strategic doctrine.

will compound the danger of any variety of nuclear attack, whether it is "limited," "protracted" or all-out nuclear war.

The plans for ABM systems are closely related to U.S. plans for the military use of space, although the Washington aggressors' cosmic ambitions are even more extensive. Sometimes they even discuss the possibility of turning future weapons in outer space into something just short of the chief means of ruling the world (with reliance, which has already proved futile so many times, on American technological "superiority"). Today the ABM systems are the primary elements of these ambitious plans. For example, Gen D. Graham, one of the ideologists of "star wars," wrote: "When we look to space in the search for a technological victory over the Soviets, we see that all of the factors advise us to emphasize strategic defense."³³

Aroused emotions cause others to go much further. "It does not take much imagination," said Under Secretary of the Air Force E. Aldridge, "to see that the country controlling space can control the world."³⁴ The previously mentioned NSDD-85 and NSDD-119, adopted in 1983 and 1984, set forth specific objectives in the extension of the arms race to outer space and the militarization of space in search of this impossible dream.

The resourceful militarist mentality in the United States is persistently seeking monstrous means of disrupting the strategic balance. Theories are being propounded. The arms race has been escalated to the maximum.

Blinded by fanaticism (and historical ignorance), the present American strategists are afraid of looking back at all of postwar history. But after all, spasmodic attempts to gain an irreversible lead were made in the 1950's, and in the 1960's, and in the 1970's, and they were quite impressive. Within 5 years, between 1949 and 1954, the number of strategic U.S. bombers was quadrupled (from 75 to 300).³⁵ At the beginning of the next decade the number of ICBM's increased 13-fold (from 63 to 834) over 3 years, between 1961 and 1964.³⁶ After another 10 years, when strategic forces were being equipped with MIRV's, the number of warheads doubled over 4 years (1970-1974)--from 4,000 to around 8,000. These spurts of activity, which included radical qualitative advances as well as quantitative changes, were accompanied by the appropriate set of militarist theories.

Each of these ambitious rounds of the race for a "winning position" ultimately ended with the erosion of American imperialism's positions. This was the result of the inexorable force of factors opposing these efforts.

The current spurt of activity by the supporters of nuclear aggression is particularly sweeping, primarily in terms of the resources spent on it and the adventurism of the plans for it. Opposing factors, however, are incomparably stronger in the 1980's than they were in the past. The Soviet Union is fully determined to block any U.S. attempts to disrupt the strategic balance and achieve military superiority.

If the United States could not attain the political or military objectives set by Washington in the 1950's and 1960's, when the United States was superior to the Soviet Union in the sphere of nuclear weapons, it is all the more

17. "Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics," ed. by R. Betts, Wash., 1981, p 90.
18. "Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Impact Statements," pp 203, 216.
19. C. Weinberger, *Op. cit.*, p 320.
20. J. Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program," *THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES*, June 1983, p 140.
21. *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, 30 May 1982.
22. *AIR FORCE MAGAZINE*, March 1982, p 63.
23. R. Scheer, "With Enough Shovels. Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War," N.Y., 1982, p 32.
24. R. Betts, "Nuclear Weapons," in "The Making of America's Soviet Policy," ed. by J. Nye, New Haven and London, 1984, p 102.
25. R. Dugger, "On Reagan. The Man and His Presidency," N.Y., 1983, p 413.
26. "IISS Strategic Survey 1982-1983," London, 1983, p 36.
27. *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE*, 16 August 1982.
28. *Ibid.*, 22 June 1982.
29. D. Ball, "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," London, 1983, pp 26, 31.
30. R. Aldridge, "First Strike: The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War," Boston, 1983, p 208.
31. "Ballistic Missile Defense," ed. by A. Carter and D. Schwartz, Wash., 1984, p 322.
32. "U.S. Military Posture, FY 1985," p 8.
33. Quoted in: F. Dyson, "Weapons and Hope," N.Y., 1984, p 253.
34. *THE DEFENSE MONITOR*, 1983, vol XII, No 5, p 1.
35. "The Superpowers in a Multi-Nuclear World," ed. by G. Kemp, R. Pfaltzgraff and U. Raanan, Lexington, 1974, p 276.
36. *Ibid.*, p 278.
37. *PRAVDA*, 30 April 1984.

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Today there are several signs of new trends in American liberalism. They reflect the mood of the particular segment of the ruling class and its constituents who reject "Reaganism" as an unreliable basis for the performance of the new tasks facing America in the sphere of economics, social relations and domestic and foreign policy, but who also believe that traditional liberal methods do not meet the requirements of these tasks either. This is the reason for the attempts to find a practical alternative to "Reaganism," which would lead, without any departure from liberal principles, to the planning of a new domestic and foreign policy line capable of serving as the Democratic Party's program of action for the 1980's.

Of course, the American variety of liberalism does not represent all American political traditions, but it will determine the chief guidelines of the reorganization of the entire spectrum of political outlooks and corresponding types of public political opinion.³ This is why the examination of new developments and trends in American liberalism at the start of the 1980's is not only of interest in itself, but can also provide the key to the evolution of political awareness, including public political opinion, in the American society.

The Outlines of Postwar Liberalism

With a view to its social-class nature, American liberalism can be defined as the ideology and policy of bourgeois reformism, aimed at the stabilization and improvement of the capitalist system and the alleviation of its inherent contradictions by means of economic and social maneuvers.

Of course, the description of American liberalism as a variety of bourgeois reformism does not mean that the liberals are incapable of taking the interests of broader segments of the American society into account to some degree and in certain respects in their approach to economic, social and political problems. According to liberals, the stability of this system can only be maintained if contradictions within it are resolved or at least alleviated and the appropriate measures are taken to secure the well-being--obviously, to varying degrees--of all of the classes and groups making up the society ("the nation as a whole," as the liberals themselves say). This fundamental aim has colored the ideological outlook and political strategy of liberalism in the postwar years. This strategy mainly emphasized the following: 1) the maintenance of steady and fairly high rates of American economic growth; 2) the consolidation of U.S. economic influence in the world; 3) the institution of social reforms within the country. These strategic aims supplemented one another and were essentially elements of a single liberal domestic and foreign policy strategy of the 1950's and 1960's, meeting the requirements of liberalism's social-class functions.

The key element of this strategy was the emphasis on economic growth. Keynesian methods of stimulating this growth were of exceptional political importance, and not just purely economic value, to the liberals. "The basic premise of this strategy, although it is not always openly acknowledged," American researcher B. Kleinberg wrote, "is the belief that the relaxation of tension in relations between different classes does not require the fundamental

It is significant that this crisis was not only the result of the overestimation of the American government's capabilities as an instrument of reformist policy. It was also a result of the underestimation of the role of the stronger global connections and global contradictions of capitalism in the approach to the resolution of national (in this case, American) problems--a development called the "crisis of the national government" by some researchers. Capitalism's uneven development, the stronger influence of the socialist world, the stronger tendency toward the internationalization of social life, stimulated by the technological revolution, and the prominence of global problems all led to changes in the geopolitical position of the United States and also dictated the need to examine America's national problems within the international context. But this approach was not part of postwar American liberalism, and it could not respond quickly enough to the changing conditions of its own "reorganization."

Just as in similar cases in the past, the immediate reaction to the new situation was an increase in conservative feelings in the United States. All of the ideas and aims which made their appearance in the late 1970's and early 1980's and were given the name "neoconservatism" provided graphic proof of this.⁶ We should remember, however, that "neoconservatism" is a complex politico-ideological current. The obviously reactionary nature of the attempts of "neoconservatives" to reverse the movement of American society, accomplish the partial dismantling of state-monopoly capitalism and extol the traditions of "free enterprise" should not obscure the fact that these attempts reflected some of the objective requirements of American capitalist development under new conditions: the need to heighten the effectiveness of the overgrown system of government regulation, the revision of some costly government programs, the more effective use of the market machinery of resource distribution, etc.

These and other issues raised by the "neoconservatives" left a substantial mark on the evolution of liberal sociopolitical thought as well. Although the leaders of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party rejected the economic recipes of the "neoconservatives," they also warned the Democrats against a return to the familiar policy of the 1960's and early 1970's. "A National Agenda for the Eighties," a report summarizing the findings of a special commission created to map out Democratic Party policy principles and political strategy for the 1980's, said that the American economy had entered a "transition period--a period of adapting its structure to changes in the world economy, to the world prices of energy and other resources, to the changing conditions of access to these resources and, finally, to the new values we now associate with non-economic aspects of the 'quality of life' and the protection of the environment."⁷ The report went on to say that since rates of economic growth under these conditions could hardly be "as impressive as in the past, it would be much more difficult to secure funds for social needs in coming years, particularly in view of the fact that expenditures on competing items in the federal budget, such as national defense, will remain at the present level."⁸

It is indicative that the authors of the report refrained from putting forth any new initiative in the sphere of social policy and even let the Americans

that G. Hart and some of his colleagues have frankly acknowledged their desire to rise above the "Left" and "Right" and to reconcile opposing ideological aims and outlooks. The birth of "neoliberalism" actually testifies to the shifting boundaries between various sections of the spectrum of political affiliations and types of political thinking, to a new, non-traditional approach to the analysis of social and political events and processes and to attempts to revive the liberal creed.

Within the "neoliberal" framework, this revision is being conducted simultaneously in several areas.

In contemporary American politics, one of the most important parameters defining the position of a particular political outlook (or type of consciousness) in the overall spectrum of political outlooks (or types of consciousness) is the attitude toward the government and the market as mechanisms for the regulation of socioeconomic processes. This attitude has served precisely as the main line separating liberalism from conservatism for more than 50 years.

Obviously, both liberals and conservatives must acknowledge the regulative functions of the government and the market, but the degree of this recognition and, consequently, the priority assigned to one or the other of these mechanisms (with all of the ensuing economic, social, political and other consequences) have differed. The conservatives have emphasized the use of the "self-regulating" machinery of the free market, and the liberals have relied primarily on the bourgeois government. Furthermore, as all of postwar history testifies, the more complex the problems the society faced, the more liberals relied on active government intervention in economic and social processes.

"Neoliberalism" has displayed a new approach to the role and functions of the government and market. As "A National Agenda for the Eighties" stressed, "the question of whether the government should or should not play its role in the resolution of our problems does not need any special discussion today because the answer is absolutely obvious: Yes, it should. What does need discussion is government's specific role in various spheres of activity..., there are numerous problems whose successful resolution demands government intervention."¹³ Of course, the "neoliberals" stress, the expediency of government intervention in a particular sphere of social and economic life must be determined without emotion and without rhetoric, and a decision must be made in each specific case on "the precise means (subsidies, nationalization, etc.) and methods of this intervention (directive, the establishment of specific standards or greater reliance on economic incentives)."¹⁴

The "neoliberals" believe that contemporary approaches to economic and social problems are no longer a matter of choosing between the market and the government. "In the developed industrial countries, including the United States," R. Reich remarked, "the practice of drawing rigid distinctions between the government and the market ceased to be useful long ago. The government creates the market by determining the conditions and limits of commercial activity on the basis of societal standards and beliefs about the government's responsibility for the healthy functioning of the economy."¹⁵ The "neoliberals," in particular, advocate the replacement of ineffective forms of government control

industrial policy in the interests of individual companies and sectors and the interests of the national economy as a whole.

This, according to the supporters of "industrial policy," will also require institutional reforms, which must give the federal government more extensive powers in economic management. This is precisely the tone of F. Rohatin's proposals, widely supported by "neoliberals," about the creation of a financial reconstruction corporation for the subsidization of depressed sectors and the regulation of capital investments for the purpose of channeling them into regions experiencing economic decline. L. Thurow proposed the creation of a national investment bank--a special government body authorized to offer loans and credit to individual enterprises, particularly in advanced industrial sectors. Similar proposals were made in the previously mentioned document "Restoring the Road to Opportunity" on the creation of a congressional committee to regulate capital investments for the purpose of "effective political control of the investment process."

In a discussion of the essential features of these plans, renowned sociologist A. Etzioni remarked: "In contrast to conservatives, who blame the depressed state of the American economy on its excessive politicization, reflected in the high percentage of the GNP controlled and redistributed by the government and in the excessive regulation of decisions made by the private sector..., they (the supporters of Rohatin and Thurow--author) believe that government should play a greater role. Their diagnosis is that, in comparison to other countries whose economies have developed successfully in recent years (such as, for example, West Germany and Japan), in the United States government institutions cannot ensure the necessary management of the private enterprise economy and its support."¹⁷

As mentioned above, the supporters of "industrial policy" advocate the creation of a consultative body on matters of economic development, with its members representing big business, big unions and government. They feel that the accelerated modernization of American industry will be impossible unless labor unions are involved in the cooperation between government and businessmen. This trilateral partnership should, in their opinion, secure the more complete integration of labor unions into the system, which will allow for the flexible combination of effective government control with the ability to attain public consent and the voluntary willingness of labor unions "to make sacrifices."

The "neoliberals'" interest in the idea of "tripartism" is a relatively new phenomenon for America. In contrast to the European countries, where various forms of socioeconomic partnerships already exist, this system is virtually absent in the United States.¹⁸

The neoliberal partnership plans envisage broader participation by labor unions in decisionmaking on the government level and on the corporate level. The "neoliberals" regard this participation as an important way of heightening labor productivity and of solving the problem of worker alienation from the labor process. With references to the experience of European labor unions, which are being involved to a greater extent in the decisionmaking process

Another important "neoliberal" premise is the realization that the United States lost its previous influence in many spheres of international life in the 1970's--primarily in the strategic (the establishment of the Soviet-U.S. balance) and economic spheres. It is indicative that the "neoliberals" do not associate this relatively weaker American position in the world with "communist intrigues" or a "communist conspiracy" (as rightists and conservatives do), but with the effects of an entire group of objective causes and factors, including those connected with the globalization of the economic, political, social and cultural life of contemporary societies and their increasing interdependence.

This realization, however, is not contrary to the "neoliberal" beliefs in the exceptional vitality of the "American system" and its ability to adapt and develop, which will allow, in their opinion, it to prevail over other social systems and take a leading role in the world. The important thing, they feel, is not to accept defeat and not to act in accordance with views corresponding to the "foreign policy consensus" of the "cold war" era, but to seek new means and methods, new forms and new spheres of exercising America's leading role within the framework of the world community.

This, according to these "neoliberals," will necessitate the following. First of all, "America should rely on democratic principles, and not on military strength" (G. Hart) to restore its moral authority in the world. The "neoliberals" have shown sufficient restraint, however, in assessing the possibility of securing global U.S. influence on world processes only on the strength of moral examples. They are distinguished by a more pragmatic approach to the use of moral and ideological factors in addition to factors of economic, political and diplomatic pressure, and even military force in some cases. This is why the "neoliberals" believe that the first objective--in order of importance--is the eradication of the crisis of the American economic model and the restoration of U.S. leadership in the economic, scientific and technical spheres, where they believe the United States has been challenged, especially by Japan and the FRG. Another American objective is the "incorporation" of the institutions and mechanisms of interdependence and the more active use of American scientific, technical and technological superiority as a powerful factor of influence in today's world.

The "Hart Phenomenon" and the Prospects of American Liberalism

The foreign policy programs recently proposed by "neoliberals," particularly Gary Hart, emphasize precisely these objectives. And although some observers have noted that many of the ideas he and his associates have expressed are borrowed from the arsenal of traditional Democratic Party foreign policy concepts, the ideas nevertheless display a close relationship to the objectives listed above. When Hart addressed the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 16 March 1984, he listed three principles on which, in his opinion, U.S. foreign policy should be based: "These are mutuality, reliability and restraint--more specifically, mutuality in our relations with the Soviet Union, reliability in our relations with our friends and allies and restraint in our relations with the Third World."

In general, the very fact of "neoliberalism's" appearance corroborates the earlier supposition that the evolution of American political thinking "will probably represent not the linear growth of stateist tendencies and the automatic lessening of market tendencies, but the continuation of the struggle between them, in which reversals and regression are possible and which could engender new, unexpected and unfamiliar constellations of political consciousness, going against existing systems of classification and requiring the construction of new models."²¹ Of course, it is still too early to speak of "neoliberalism" as a fully developed current. It is certainly too early to speak of it as a fully developed type of public political thinking. It is in the formative stage, and it will probably be some time before it acquires its more or less final form and is widely accepted in the social strata whose objective interests it expresses.

It is already fairly evident, however, that American liberalism is gradually surmounting its ideological crisis, that this could be the prelude to the eradication of its political crisis and that it could strengthen Democratic Party positions. This is being promoted by the widespread public dissatisfaction with the current administration's efforts to continuously escalate the arms race, settle foreign policy issues by force and continue increasing defense spending by making cuts in allocations for social needs, and by the intensification of the contradictions of "Reaganomics."

FOOTNOTES

1. "Rethinking Liberalism," edited by W. Anderson, New York, 1983, p 1.
2. Ibid.
3. A detailed description of these outlooks and types can be found in the book "Sovremennoye politicheskoye soznaniye v SShA" [Contemporary Political Awareness in the United States], Moscow, 1980.
4. B. Kleinberg, "American Society in the Postindustrial Age: Technocracy, Power and the End of Ideology," Columbus (Ohio), 1973, p 37.
5. T. Skocpol, "Legacies of New Deal Liberalism," DISSENT, Winter 1983, p 34.
6. A. Yu. Mel'vil', "Sotsial'naya filosofiya sovremennogo amerikanskogo konservatizma" [The Social Philosophy of Present-Day American Conservatism], Moscow, 1980; "SShA: konservativnaya volna" [The United States: The Conservative Wave], ed. by A. Yu. Mel'vil', Moscow, 1984.
7. "A National Agenda for the Eighties. Report of the Presidential Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties," Wash., 1980, p 5.
8. Ibid., p 2.
9. Ibid., p 28.

DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 50-54

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko]

[Text] Several of the problems disturbing Americans were discussed at the Democratic Party convention of 16-19 July in San Francisco. The preparations for the convention and the convention itself--although it did take place in the traditional circus atmosphere of all such events--bore the imprint of the country's general state of difficulty.

In addition to the wave of chauvinism and militarism which swept the Reagan Administration into office in 1980, another wave has been gathering strength in the country, a wave of fear and worries about the future, about the future of whole segments of the population without "a place in the sun" and about the future of the entire country, which the Reagan Administration has driven to the verge of nuclear conflict and, consequently, to the verge of suicide. With a view to the growth of this wave, Democratic Party leaders and the extremely influential forces behind the party are basing the campaign for the election of the president and many congressmen on the slogan: "Let us advance into the future by making the changes that cannot be put off any longer."

But exactly what kind of changes are these? This is still largely indefinite. All that is definite is that the Democrats realize the scales of the mounting wave of anxiety and dissatisfaction in the country and would like to ride this wave to victory and regain the power they lost in the 1980 elections.

By the time of the convention, the Democrats appeared to be plagued by incurable vacillation and insurmountable disagreements. The three main contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination--Carter Administration Vice-President W. Mondale, Senator G. Hart and prominent black leader from Chicago J. Jackson--fought a genuinely fierce battle during the primaries in various states for electoral votes and for the support of future convention delegates. They frequently took widely diverging positions during this campaign. It is important to underscore another fact: Paradoxically enough, the results of this battle, which went on for several months and appeared to be a fight to the death rather than a fight for life, came as a surprise to many people. To many, but not to all. It is not likely that they surprised the people behind the scenes who

solve our problems and the attempt to pretend they do not exist; between the spirit of community and the corroding effects of egotism; between justice for all and privileges for the chosen few; between social welfare and social Darwinism; between broader opportunities and narrower horizons; between diplomacy and conflicts; between arms control and the arms race; between leadership and the search for excuses. America is at a crossroads."

In the sphere of domestic policy, the Democrats have promised to put the economy in order, assigning priority to the rapid reduction of the federal budget deficit, which is now approaching 200 billion dollars and is still growing as a result of administration expenditures exceeding budget revenues. This is known to be largely due to excessive military expenditures, which are projected at 300 billion dollars in fiscal year 1985. Economists have warned that if this trend should continue, payments on the national debt, including interest, will soon exceed all federal budget revenues and the treasury will simply go bankrupt. The authors of the program do not advocate any cardinal reduction of military expenditures, but they do point out the need to bring them in line with economic capabilities.

The program contains important statements about Democratic policy on arms and on many foreign policy issues.

Here are some of their aims:

To update the SALT II treaty and resubmit it to the Senate for discussion and agreement;

To conduct major stabilizing reductions of nuclear arsenals within the SALT II framework while observing the limitations of this treaty and insisting that the USSR take exactly the same steps;

To propose the unification of the talks on the limitation of medium-range and strategic weapons if the President should decide that this will promote a comprehensive agreement on arms limitation with the Soviet Union;

To immediately resubmit the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and 1976 treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to the Senate for discussion and agreement;

To conclude a verifiable treaty on a total nuclear test ban;

To actively promote the conclusion of a verifiable treaty on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons and space weapons;

To make every effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

To stop the production of the MX missile and B-1 bomber;

To prohibit the production of nerve gas and to promote the conclusion of a verifiable treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons and so forth.

When we examine these points of the Democratic program, we must remember that the promises bourgeois parties make in their campaign platforms are certainly not always kept by the new administration.

members of ethnic minorities, and Mondale's choice of Ferraro as his running-mate was an acknowledgement of the role women will always play from now on in our country's politics."

The Republicans are preparing for a desperate campaign battle because they are fully aware that their administration has severely undermined the trust of the general public in the last 4 years. There has been a perceptible increase in demagogic statements from the White House, the head of which is using his position as a free campaign rostrum. Displaying absolute disregard for facts, Reagan and the Reaganists are extolling the Republican administration's domestic and foreign policy. They sound as though they have been staying up all night worrying about the needs and desires of the working public, about America's prestige in the world and about the prospects for peace on earth, and as though...they even made constant attempts to engage in constructive talks with the Soviet Union. In reality, however, Reagan and his "team" are still fueling chauvinistic, anti-Soviet and militarist feelings in the country.

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These are the reasons why both the American and the Mexican side tried to avoid any mention of the acute problems and conflicts abounding in American-Mexican relations during the talks. Nevertheless, as the press in both countries reported, conflicting approaches to the regional crisis and to the situation in Central America in particular could not be concealed.

It is no secret that Mexico and the United States view the events in the Caribbean in different ways. Whereas the Reagan Administration has made references to the "Cuban" and "Nicaraguan threat" to rationalize the unceremonious American intervention in regional affairs, the Mexican leadership justifiably feels that the main causes are poverty, underdevelopment and the severe internal conflicts which are rending the undemocratic regimes totally supported by the United States. When the president of Mexico spoke in Washington, he remarked: "We are convinced that the conflict in Central America is the result of economic weaknesses, political backwardness and social injustice in the countries of our region. For this reason, we cannot agree that reforms and structural changes pose a threat to other countries in our hemisphere."

During the visit both sides tried to underscore their interest in settling the conflict, regardless of its causes. But the problem was, the 21 May issue of NEWSWEEK remarked, that "there are also differing views on the methods of settling the conflict."

The Mexican view of the events in Central America, prominent Mexican political scientist A. Zinser noted in the anthology "The Future of Central America: Political Choices for the United States and Mexico," is that these events are not threatening the national security of the United States or Mexico. For this reason, "the countries of the region should be given a chance to develop in their own way."

This approach certainly does not mean that Mexico is indifferent to events in Central America. It is disturbed and troubled by the situation in the region. This is why it participated in drafting the proposals of the Contadora Group, put forth a number of initiatives and made an effort to organize American-Nicaraguan contacts. The first meeting of official representatives of Nicaragua and the United States--Deputy Foreign Minister V. Ugo Tinoco and special representative of the American President G. Shlaudeman--took place at the end of June in Mexico, in the peaceful resort town of Manzanillo.

There is a vast difference between the Mexican approach to the conflict and the position of the United States, which is intervening flagrantly in the internal affairs of sovereign states, ostensibly to defend its own security and the security of Mexico, and is seeking every possible pretext for the use of military force. For several years the Reagan Administration has been trying to convince the "naive Mexicans" that Mexico could also be "seized by the Reds" unless immediate steps are taken (of a military nature, of course). In February 1984, President Reagan signed PD-124, sanctioning economic and political pressure on Mexico to force it to support U.S. policy in Central America: the directive envisaged the cessation of American economic assistance. Before M. De la Madrid's visit, THE WASHINGTON POST reported, the White House temporarily refrained from economic pressure, but the directive prescribed "more

In June the American Congress passed a special law to legalize the status of immigrants who entered the United States illegally after 1980. Around 6 million illegal immigrants now live in the United States, and half of them are Mexican. The passage of this law was widely publicized by the administration as a major concession to Mexico, which has always had an oversensitive reaction to the deportation of immigrants. In fact, the new law is primarily in the interests of American agricultural firms, which want cheap labor and, what is most important, laborers who have no rights. It does not provide immigrants with even minimal employment rights. The American press called it a "legalization of slavery."

Just before his trip to Washington, M. De la Madrid said that he hoped to "personally inform the President (of the United States--P. L.) of all our problems and ask him to facilitate the entry of Mexican goods into the United States, find a way of strengthening investments in Mexico and help Mexico attract more American tourists."

The only request Washington is likely to consider is the extension of more credit to Mexico, and even this will be done largely for the purpose of preventing the collapse of the Mexican financial system, which is closely connected to the American one. Recently, Mexico received additional loans totaling 3.8 billion dollars from international banks with the assistance of the United States. The interest payments, however, are bleeding its economy dry. It is true that Washington's protectionist policy, which limits the access of goods from Mexico and other Latin American countries to the U.S. market, is rebounding against the United States: It is substantially limiting their ability to buy American goods; as a result, the Latin American countries reduced their imports from the United States by 32 billion dollars between 1981 and 1983, and this is equivalent to the loss of 600,000 jobs in the United States.

During the Mexican president's visit, Washington announced a new rise in interest rates. This meant that Mexico's foreign debt automatically increased by several billion dollars. It is quite understandable that the Mexican public regarded this as an unfriendly act, especially during a summit-level meeting. The head of the central Mexican labor organization, F. Velasquez, said that the higher interest rate would make economic conditions in Mexico even worse and the Mexican National Chamber of the Processing Industry stressed that this decision attested to the inconsistency of U.S. words and actions.

The Reagan Administration's behavior aroused anger in many Latin American countries precisely because it was inconsistent with Washington's earlier statements and assurances. The presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico published a joint declaration demanding the reduction of interest rates.

When the Mexican president addressed the American Congress, he appealed for dialogue and mutual understanding between the industrially developed countries and the Latin American states. "Mexico and the countries of Latin America are striving to establish relations of a new type with the United States on the basis of equality and mutual respect. They want to rid themselves of all traces of subordination and to preserve their sovereignty and national

ANNUAL ACDA REPORT REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 105-107

[Review by V. I. Kuznetsov of book "Fiscal Year 1984 Arms Control Impact Statements," Wash., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, XXV + 372 pages]

[Text] The Reagan Administration's attempts to achieve military superiority to the USSR are extremely destabilizing and pose a threat to peace. They are difficult to conceal even with the aid of the most clever arguments. This is reaffirmed by the examination of the annual report prepared for the U.S. Congress by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

One of the agency's main duties is to submit documents regularly to the Washington legislators to report on the correspondence of American military programs to the letter and spirit of treaties and of arms limitation and disarmament principles officially acknowledged by the U.S. Government. Once again, just as in the past, the agency had to perform the obviously impossible task of "whitewashing" the military preparations of an administration insisting on the deployment of the most dangerous weapon systems.

The first programs examined in the report are those pertaining to strategic weapons, including the land-based component of the U.S. strategic triad--ICBM's. Here the position of the agency is already quite apparent.

In October 1981 Reagan announced his administration's decision to deploy at least 100 MX missiles within the near future with a total potential of 1,000 highly accurate and powerful nuclear warheads, capable of destroying such well-fortified targets as ICBM silos and strategic command systems with almost 100-percent accuracy. The compilers of the report rationalize this dramatic buildup of first-strike potential simply with the harmless "need" to eradicate some kind of disparity resulting from U.S. "unilateral limitations" at a time when the Soviet Union, they say, "deployed a new generation" of strategic systems (p 12). It is true that they also admit that the USSR will interpret the deployment of the MX as a U.S. attempt to gain strategic advantages. But this is applauded in the report, because this will supposedly create "additional incentives" for the USSR to engage in "serious" arms limitation talks with the United States. This "line of reasoning" proves that the agency is willing to defend any military preparations.

The agency also devotes a large section of its report to strategic defense programs. According to the administration's plans, ABM systems and space defense systems should constitute the basis of these programs.

Space defense systems began to be discussed widely in the United States a relatively short time ago--at the end of the 1970's. The development of these systems is being accompanied by allegations that the USSR has been highly active in this field. The report also mentions some kind of "existing" system of this type in the Soviet Union (p 121).

In 1978 and 1979 Soviet-American talks were held for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the curtailment of the arms race connected with space defense systems, but the American delegation soon broke off the talks. The agency justifies the American side's move with references to "national security" considerations. But if the United States were really lagging behind in this sphere of such great importance to it, as the report says several times, it would have been highly illogical to break off talks serving the goals of stronger security.

Of course, the United States had another reason. Space is precisely the sphere in which the United States intends to achieve the superiority it wants and thereby acquire a chance to exert political pressure on the USSR. It is no coincidence that there are "deletions" in this part of the report (the full text of the document is available, as we know, only to the Congress), and these deletions are present not only where the properties of space defense systems are described, but also where the goals of their projected deployment are listed (p 121).

One of the standard arguments used to validate the development of ABM systems in the United States, despite the restrictions listed in the 1972 ABM treaty, is the allegation that the Soviet Union undertook the serious improvement of the qualitative features of its ICBM's in recent years, and that this has radically undermined the ability of American "deterrence" forces to take countermeasures. The agency also takes this position and supports the intensive development in this sphere. Furthermore, the report even says that broad-scale R & D in the ABM sphere will only make the treaty more "viable" and create "favorable conditions" for future strategic arms limitation talks (p 134).

Arguments further from the truth would be hard to invent. After all, as even American authorities have repeatedly admitted, the Reagan Administration's present ABM programs will undermine the 1972 agreements. They could step up the arms race in the defensive and offensive respects.

The section on medium-range nuclear weapons is also intriguing. It focuses on questions connected with the deployment of land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe. In particular, it says that 560 cruise missiles are to be delivered for this purpose: 464 to be put on alert and 96 to be used for testing, training and replacement. Of course, the agency asserts that the cruise missiles are capable of having only a "stabilizing effect" (p 177). As for the Pershing II missiles, according to the agency there will

BOOK VIEWS REAGAN POLICY ON RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) p 111

[Review by I. N. Kravchenko of book "'Sily bystrogo razvertyvaniya' vo vneshney politike SShA" [The "Rapid Deployment Force" in U.S. Foreign Policy], by V. M. Men'shikov and P. V. Pen'shikov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 107 pages]

[Text] Ronald Reagan's 4 years in the White House have been marked by a number of actions to further U.S. imperialism's hegemonic ambitions. The creation of a special mobile unit for the Pentagon, the so-called "rapid deployment force" (RDF), is prominent among these actions. With the aid of extensive documented information, the authors of the book describe the workings of this police unit patrolling vast regions of the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, etc. (p 11).

The deployment of the RDF in key spots in the Pacific, in the Near and Middle East and on the African or Latin American continents is mainly intended to counteract the national liberation movements, which the White House can no longer ignore (p 80). The authors take a detailed look at the structure and workings of the RDF, its deployment patterns, maneuvers and actions in the deserts of North Africa, oil-producing regions in the Middle East and other hot spots in the world.

According to the authors, the interventionist RDF, trained and equipped with the latest means of warfare, including nuclear weapons, represents "an army in search of a war," or, as the American PROGRESSIVE magazine recently put it, "in search of a battlefield for the display of its capabilities."

Directing attention to the active U.S. efforts to create a "second-echelon" RDF--the NATO combined rapid deployment force (the RDF is now independent of the North Atlantic bloc)--V. M. Men'shikov and P. V. Men'shikov trace the White House's efforts to globalize NATO's role. They describe Washington's search for means of exerting pressure on each of its partners within the framework of the notorious "Atlantic solidarity" for the purpose of forcing them to support the Reagan Administration's aggressive policy (p 37).

Vehement opposition to this belligerent policy is growing in the United States, and not only within the antimilitarist movement or pacifist organizations, but

BOOK VIEWS U.S. ATTEMPT TO BLOCK GAS PIPELINE PROJECT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) p 112

[Review by B. P. Sitnikov of book "Kontrakt veka (o gazoprovode Zapadnaya Sibir'--Zapadnaya Yevropa)" [The Contract of the Century (On the Pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe)] by I. S. Bagramyan and A. F. Shakay, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, 94 pages]

[Text] Ceremonies marking the completion of the transcontinental gas pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe were held on 13 January 1984 in Ober-Geilbach, a town located at the juncture of Alsace and Lotaringia. The completion of this pipeline signified the total failure of the White House's unprecedented attempts to wreck the "deal of the century" and discredit the idea of productive East-West cooperation.

In this book, which is written in a journalistic style, the authors discuss the economic and social aspects of this unique international agreement and thoroughly examine all of the forms and methods of Washington's "antigas warfare," subjecting all of the American propaganda "conclusions" and "arguments" to a discerning analysis and describing the resulting acute conflicts between the United States and its NATO allies.

Attempts to weaken the economies of the socialist states, especially the Soviet Union, and to undermine trade contacts with the Western countries, the authors note, lay at the basis of Washington's foreign political and economic strategy for the 1980's. "The United States, realizing the dangerous implications of head-on confrontation with our country and the Warsaw Pact states, is trying to destroy socialism on the economic front by exhausting it, on the one hand, with an arms race and, on the other, by depriving the socialist economies of the advantages of international division of labor.... The White House chose the 'gas for pipes' transaction as the chief target of this war" (pp 51-52).

The scenarios of the antigas campaign were composed in the United States, and all of the main roles were written. Members of the highest echelons of government--President R. Reagan, former Secretary of State A. Haig, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and some senators and congressmen--took an active part in the attack on the transcontinental pipeline. According to Republican

BOOK VIEWS U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN ASIAN PACIFIC

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 112-113

[Review by M. I. Zakhmatov of book "Ekonomicheskiye interesy SShA v aziatsko-tikhookeanskom regione" [U.S. Economic Interests in the Asian Pacific] by A. B. Parkanskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 208 pages]

[Text] The United States has recently intensified its efforts to escalate the arms race and to increase friction in the Pacific basin. In connection with this, the new book by A. B. Parkanskiy is quite timely. It contains an analysis of the latest trends in U.S. foreign economic ties with developed and developing countries in the Asian Pacific region, a detailed description of long-range tendencies in their socioeconomic development and an exposure of the real essence of U.S. economic policy.

The author correctly notes that by the beginning of the 1980's U.S. foreign economic ties had already become an important part of the reproduction process. This is graphically demonstrated by a comparison of exports and imports to physical production. The proportion accounted for by exports in U.S. physical production rose from 14 percent in 1970 to 29 percent in 1980, and the figure for imports rose from 14 to 34 percent during the same period--that is, the indicators reached their highest point of this century.*

These processes are particularly noticeable in the American Pacific coast states, where the development of the main sectors of the economy--the aerospace, electrical equipment and radioelectronic industries, instrument building and some branches of the extractive, timber and food industries, agriculture and the service sphere--are indissolubly connected with foreign markets and foreign sources of crude resources and materials.

The importance of Pacific expansion to the United States is constantly growing. In the 1960's U.S. activity in the economies of the Asian Pacific region was much less intense than the efforts to broaden economic ties with the West European states, especially the EEC countries. At the beginning of the 1980's, however, the developed capitalist and developing countries and territories of

* INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS, Wash., June 1983, pp 36-37.

BOOK ON U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 113-114

[Review by B. I. Gvozdev of book "Kuba v mezhamerikanskikh otnosheniyakh" [Cuba in Inter-American Relations] by V. Kh. Vladimirov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 302 pages]

[Text] This book analyzes the effect of the Cuban revolution on the development of the international situation in the Western Hemisphere and the struggle of the Latin American people against the expansionist aims of U.S. imperialism and for an independent foreign policy line in their own national interests.

The Cuban patriots' liberation wars of the last third of the 19th century were the prelude, as Cuban leaders have repeatedly stressed, to the glorious Cuban revolution, "which not only overthrew a bourgeois-oligarchic regime in one of the Latin American countries but also struck a blow at the imperialist interests of the United States on the continent" (p 70). The victory of the Cuban revolution proved that even in Latin America, which had been regarded as imperialism's home front, forces resolutely advocating the eradication of exploitative regimes and the creation of a new society in the interests of the workers could triumph.

The crisis in U.S. relations with Latin American countries is specifically reflected in the bankruptcy of the doctrines and theories designed to "justify" U.S. hegemony on the continent: Pan-Americanism, the theory of ideological boundaries, the concept of the "peaceful regulated revolution" and others. The Latin American countries are trying to break out of the Procrustean Bed of the inter-American system to united action in the international arena and global political and economic relations. The crisis became even more severe after such unlawful actions by the imperialist powers as the U.S. aggression against Grenada, the "undeclared war" the Pentagon and CIA are fighting against Nicaragua and Washington's continuous and massive anti-Cuban campaigns.

Movements for the preservation of natural resources and the stricter observance of the fundamental principles of international law, recorded in the UN Charter, are gaining strength in the Latin American countries.

The increased participation of Latin American countries in the nonaligned movement, which has become an influential force in world politics, is a vivid

SEMEYKO REVIEWS 'THREAT TO PEACE' BOOKLET

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 114-117

[Review by L. S. Semeyko of book "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [Where the Threat to Peace Comes From], 3d edition, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, 96 pages]

[Text] Principled but objective judgments, informative and simultaneously analytical material--this is a brief description of the third edition of "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," published this July. The first edition (1982), followed by a second, supplemented edition published the same year, immediately aroused the interest of the Soviet and world public.

The third edition, which retains the format of the previous editions and many of their important conclusions, reflects the new international events of the last 2 years, the present state of the American military machine and the military strategy of the United States and NATO. The new subsections on the verification of treaties and agreements and on the prevention of the militarization of space are of great value. The sections on general-purpose forces and chemical weapons have been expanded. The politically pertinent question of the actual causes of the disruption of nuclear arms talks and the substance of Soviet responses are revealed, and new facts and figures--and quite a few of them--are cited for a more complete evaluation of the present military and political situation in the world. All of this means that the information in the third edition is not only pertinent but also quite current.

The main features of present-day U.S. military strategy, a strategy of aggression, and its material base--the armed forces--are discussed in detail in the book. The Pentagon's declared strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR is supposed to ensure that the United States will "prevail" in a nuclear war and will "be able to force the USSR to quickly cease all hostilities on U.S. terms" (p 64). An essential condition for this is military superiority to the USSR in all respects--in strategic offensive weapons, in space and in conventional weapons--and the willingness to start various types of aggressive wars--nuclear and conventional, general and "limited," relatively quick and protracted. Putting special emphasis on preparations for "limited" nuclear wars with the aim of guarding U.S. territory against a retaliatory nuclear strike, the engineers of American military strategy have not placed any restrictions on "geographic" escalation. The armed forces are to be prepared for general warfare against the USSR and its

The American attempts to achieve military superiority are analyzed in detail in the book. The creation of the comprehensive strategic (offensive plus defensive) potential for a first, pre-emptive strike occupies a central position among these attempts. The capabilities of strategic offensive forces are to be augmented at least 1.5-fold, with emphasis on the deployment of new, highly accurate weapon systems (p 36). There has been a particularly dramatic reversal in the direction of the militarization of space. The development and deployment of antisatellite weapons within the near future and ABM systems in the more distant future certainly do not have a defensive purpose. "For the United States, the creation of antisatellite forces would be meaningless if it were not planning to deliver a first strike and start a nuclear war"--this statement, quoted in the book, by the author of numerous studies of U.S. military space programs, Karas, candidly reveals the real purpose of the "star wars" program (p 38). The real purpose is to secure the ability to deliver the first nuclear strike against the USSR with impunity. But these efforts are futile. "In this case, Washington has forgotten the simple fact that the party against whom these decisions are made will certainly not sit back and wait for these events to occur. This party will do everything possible to frustrate the potential aggressor's adventurist plans. And there is no question that they will be frustrated" (p 40). Reagan's "defense plan" is paving the way for a fundamentally new and extremely dangerous round of the strategic arms race, which would have an extremely negative effect on the prospects for arms limitation and reduction, would make the future USSR-U.S. strategic balance unpredictable and, what is most important, would dramatically increase the danger of nuclear war. At a specific stage of the arms race, the creation of an "absolutely reliable shield" and "inescapable sword" could give the United States the illusion of superiority, and this could motivate it to push the nuclear button.

The stepped-up development of American general-purpose forces is given serious attention in the book--theater nuclear weapons, ground troops, tactical aviation and the navy. The main emphasis in the plans for the augmentation of their strength has now been placed on offensive capabilities in war with and without the use of nuclear weapons. The "Assault Breaker" search-and-destroy system is being developed, and a fundamentally new weapon system, a search-and-destroy complex designed for deep offensive actions is being tested in the Air Force. These and other measures to heighten the fire and striking power of conventional forces are completely in line with the new "Airland Battle" concept adopted by the United States in August 1982 (and by NATO in December of that year). This concept, the book says, presupposes surprise attacks with the use of all of the latest means of armed struggle at great operational depths in order to deliver the maximum strike against enemy troops, gain an overwhelming advantage and launch a resolute offensive to seize enemy territory (p 68). It is clear that this is a concept of an exceptionally aggressive and offensive nature. Its logical connection to first-strike plans is obvious, and this certainly disturbs those who have given serious thought to the real reasons for the heightened danger of war.

The conclusive arguments presented in the book and the reinforcement of statements with facts and figures, including the latest statistics, again lead to an unambiguous conclusion: The American threat to peace is growing. There is a frightening chain in evidence here: the emphasis on pre-emption in military doctrine, the creation of the appropriate nuclear potential and the

LEGISLATIVE VETO OVERTURN SEEN STRENGTHENING PRESIDENT VS. CONGRESS

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[Article by A. A. Mishin: "Legal Relations Between the President and the Congress"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] People in the United States are still debating a Supreme Court decision of June 1983 on a case directly related to a fairly common matter in American jurisprudence--the deportation of a foreign citizen who remained in the country after his visa had expired. This decision, however, had immediate and acute political repercussions and aroused the interest of the public, the media, the administration and the Congress. The reason was that the Supreme Court decision said that the so-called legislative veto was unconstitutional and thereby essentially repealed provisions in almost 200 laws envisaging the possible use of this veto power. The heated debates in political and legal circles were less the result of the wholesale nullification of an impressive number of laws than of the political implications of the repeal of the legislative veto in the President's relations with the Congress. The influential American weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT expressed this opinion: "The crushing Supreme Court decision, which restricts the authority of legislators, gave rise to a fierce struggle between the Congress and the White House, which should rage on for many years."¹

We should recall that the U.S. Constitution originally granted the veto (Latin for "I forbid") power only to the President; Section 7 of Article 1 of the constitution empowers him not to sign a bill submitted to him and to return it to the Congress "with his objections." Only a qualified majority (two-thirds) vote in each of the two congressional chambers can override the presidential veto. The presidential veto is unique because he can reject only the entire bill, and not individual portions of it. In contrast to the present, the governor of a state has "item" veto power--that is, he can veto individual items of a bill from the state legislature.

The President of the United States also has so-called "pocket veto" power. The President exercises this right when he deliberately avoids signing a bill within the 10 days specified in the constitution just at the time when the Congress will adjourn before the end of this period. In this case, the bill is considered to be rejected: Congress cannot override the "pocket veto" because no procedure is envisaged for these cases.

The legislative veto means that a regulating act or decision of the President, an executive department or a federal agency is prohibited by the Congress as a whole or one of its chambers (or a standing committee). This means, consequently, that Congress can control the exercise of delegated powers by executive bodies. The right of the legislative veto with a specified deadline for its use and the subjects empowered to exercise the right were stipulated in each specific case in a congressional act.

For example, the 1973 resolution on war powers, having the force of law, stipulated that if the President should commit U.S. armed forces to action in any other country in the absence of a declaration of war or a special legal order, the Congress can, by a concurrent resolution (that is, a resolution of both houses), require the President to recall the armed forces without delay. The 1974 act on congressional budget control stipulated that any time the President asked the Congress to approve a delay in budget appropriations, his request could be denied by a resolution of any chamber. According to the 1982 law on Department of Defense appropriations, any change in specific appropriations for military purchases in excess of stipulated limits could be vetoed by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Stipulations of this kind, pertaining to methods of using the legislative veto, are present in almost 200 congressional acts. The judicial procedure of the legislative veto usually took the form of concurrent or simple resolutions. In contrast to bills or joint resolutions, which are passed by both houses and go into effect only after they have been signed by the President within the 10 days specified in the constitution (and can be rejected by him), concurrent and simple resolutions are passed either by both houses or one and do not require the President's signature. This means that the President cannot veto them in the way that he vetoes bills and joint resolutions. Finally, bills and joint resolutions become laws after they have received presidential approval, whereas concurrent and simple resolutions are not regulative because they do not stipulate general rules of behavior but refer only to specific cases.

Therefore, the legislative veto has a special force and impact. It is absolute because it cannot be rejected by the executive branch. The presidential veto, however, is in the nature of a postponement because it can be overridden by the repassage of the bill or by a joint resolution supported by two-thirds of the vote in each house.

The legislative veto was engendered by the delegation of regulating powers to executive bodies by the Congress. For this reason, the frequency of the passage of acts envisaging the legislative veto increased as Congress delegated more regulating powers. Between 1932 and 1939, for example, 5 laws envisaging the legislative veto were passed; 19 such laws were passed between 1940 and 1949; 34 between 1950 and 1959; 49 between 1960 and 1969; 89 within the next 5 years (1970-1975); over 30 during just the first two and a half years of Ronald Reagan's presidency.³

Laws envisaging the legislative veto were not only passed but were also enforced, and quite effectively. By using the veto power, the legislative branch rejected 14 of President Truman's 47 reorganization plans, 3 of

constitutional veto or the threat of its use, while the latter used the legislative veto or its fiscal powers.

During the 50-year dispute over the expediency of the legislative veto, its supporters and opponents actually used the same arguments. Both made references to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and insisted on the effective exercise of powers by the Congress and the federal administration.

The supporters of the legislative veto made references to abuses of regulating powers by federal agencies and demanded the reinstatement of the Congress as the only constitutional legislative body. In 1979, for example, a law was passed on Federal Trade Commission (FTC) appropriations, with one of its amendments envisaging a unicameral veto. According to this amendment, each congressional house had the right to protest any FTC decision affecting all industry within 60 days. Senator H. Schmitt presented interesting arguments in favor of this amendment: "The authors of the constitution did not have our discomfort in mind when they composed this document. They wanted accountability and the separation of powers. They wanted elected representatives to sign the laws of our nation. The FTC's present powers to write and enforce laws, called rules, is an encroachment upon our traditional belief that only elected officials should write laws. The legislative veto is a reasonable legislative solution to this problem. The delegation of legislative powers to the FTC can continue, but the Congress must have the right to control these powers and prevent their abuse."⁶

The supporters of the legislative veto also said that its use against presidential foreign policy decisions would restore the constitutional powers the White House had usurped in the sphere of foreign policy. Commenting on the 1973 resolution on war powers, Senator E. Kennedy said: "The provision on the legislative veto was intended to restore the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to 'declare war' and to 'raise and support armies.'"⁷

Conservative critics of the legislative veto believe that it weakens presidential authority, makes it less flexible and efficient, allows liberal legislators to interfere in foreign policy, which has traditionally been regarded as the President's domain, restricts the constitutional duty of the President to see to the proper execution of laws and reduces the overall effectiveness of the exercise of domestic and foreign policy powers by the executive branch.⁸

Liberal critics of the legislative veto believe that it serves the interests of business because it gives the Congress a chance to reject executive decisions having at least some restraining effect on business interests.

According to many American attorneys and politicians, the dubious constitutionality of the legislative veto and the negative attitude of conservatives and liberals toward this veto have made many people wonder why it has existed for so long in spite of this and why it is being used more and more widely.

It was inevitable that the constant political friction between the executive and legislative branches would necessitate intervention by the third branch, the judiciary, to settle the matter of the constitutionality of the legislative

of Article 1 of the constitution, regulating this process, are an integral part of the constitutional separation of powers. The legislative veto, in accordance with the constitution, could be regarded as a legislative act, and the corresponding procedures specified in the constitution should then extend to it. The adoption of a legislative act is a power exercised jointly by both congressional houses and the President.

The principle of bicameralism, lying at the basis of the legislative process, presupposes that all legislative acts--bills and joint resolutions--must be approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Supreme Court particularly stressed: "An examination of the action taken by one chamber in accordance with §244 (c) (2) of the 1952 act indicates that it was essentially legislative in its purpose and implications. Consequently, this action, called the legislative veto, was taken in violation of Article 1 of the constitution."

Another principle of the legislative process which the Supreme Court considers to have been violated by the legislative veto is the principle of presidential approval of the draft legislative act. Section 7 of Article 1 of the constitution specifies that each bill approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate must be sent to the President and will become law only after he has signed it. This principle was also violated because the House decision on the deportation was not sent to the President.

Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the decision to deport Chadha and the others could be made in only one way--with the approval of both houses and the subsequent submission of the decision to the President for his approval. The Supreme Court stressed that the constitution clearly defines the categories of unicameral actions not requiring presidential approval.

Supreme Court Justice L. Powell supported the final conclusion of the majority of court members on the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto, but cited other arguments in favor of this choice. He believes, in particular, that the Congress usurped judicial functions in the Chadha case and thereby violated the principle of the separation of powers. Powell stressed that the House of Representatives was essentially performing the functions of a judicial body when it investigated the case on the deportation of an individual. The unconstitutionality of this action is particularly obvious in view of the fact that the Congress, in contrast to judicial or administrative bodies investigating disputes in the manner established by law, is not bound by legal standards or procedural rules.

In contrast to the majority of members of the court, L. Powell regards the legislative veto of administrative decisions on deportation as a judicial action, and not a legislative one. Nevertheless, he also concluded that the use of the legislative veto by a congressional chamber contradicts the principle of the separation of powers because one branch of government takes on the functions assigned by the constitution to another branch.

The Supreme Court decision, compiled by Chief Justice Burger on behalf of the majority of court members, as well as the opinion of L. Powell, contains numerous references to the protocols of the Constitutional Convention, the

In his dissenting opinion, Justice White consistently supports the idea that the legislative veto is actually the only means of controlling the vast quantity of extremely complex delegated regulating powers of executive departments and administrative agencies, covering a much broader range than the regulating activity of the Congress itself. The legislative veto, White says, is not a legislative measure, but a means of congressional control over the regulating activity of the executive branch, performed on the instructions of the Congress. Furthermore, White quite logically notes that as soon as the functioning of the institutions of the contemporary government requires extensive powers, which are essentially legislative or "quasilegislative" by virtue of their broad range, the Congress has the right to control the exercise of the powers it has delegated with the aid of such means as the legislative veto.

Actually, the Supreme Court officially recognized the unconstitutionality of only the unicameral veto. "The court's analysis of Article 1 of the constitution," White wrote, "quite probably divests all forms of the legislative veto of their legal force, regardless of their procedures and objects." This view is not shared by all, but, judging by articles in the American press, it is the prevailing view. This is why White feels that the Supreme Court decision is regrettable, because the court "imprudently" called provisions of almost 200 laws unconstitutional in the investigation of a case concerning the specific matter of the deportation of certain individuals.

PROSPECTS FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO WITH OTHER FORMS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. At first, we might think that this Supreme Court decision would lead to perceptible changes in the relations between the President and the Congress in the system of checks and balances in favor of the executive branch. In any case, the Capitol's pointedly negative reaction to the decision could be a strong argument in support of this conclusion. But there are also other points of view. For example, when political science Professor N. Ornstein addressed a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 20 July 1983, he said: "It is quite obvious that the Supreme Court decision will engender more problems for the executive branch in the performance of its functions and much more work for the Congress."¹⁰ We must not forget that the executive branch cannot work without executing the regulating powers delegated by the Congress. In turn, the Congress must oversee this activity in one way or another.

It is still too early to draw any final conclusions about all of the possible effects of the Supreme Court decision on the U.S. machinery of government. It is possible, however, that Congress will take measures to compensate for the loss of the legislative veto.

Immediately after the announcement of the Supreme Court decision, Congress began discussing new forms of control over the regulating activity of the executive branch without the legislative veto. The following main alternatives are now being considered:¹¹

1. The repeal of all laws containing provisions on the legislative veto, and the passage of new laws regulating the execution of powers delegated to the executive branch.

9. Excerpts from the Supreme Court decision on the Chadha case are taken from the official text of the decision-- Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha et al, S. Ct. No 80-1832 (1983).
10. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 23 July 1983, p 1501.
11. Ibid.

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